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STATE V. BUDA: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT,
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, AND
“TESTIMONIAL” COMPETENCE
Andrew Darcy

∗

The last temptation is the greatest of treason: To do the right
1
deed for the wrong reason.

I.

INTRODUCTION

“‘Dad says nobody beat me. I fell when I was sleeping in my
2
3
room.’” A three-year-old child, N.M., made this statement to a New
Jersey Division of Youth Services (DYFS) employee, Miriam Nurudeen, while hospitalized for injuries apparently sustained from physi4
cal abuse. Nurudeen recounted his statements to a jury in a criminal
trial against Ryan Buda—the boyfriend of N.M.’s mother, Christine,
5
whom N.M. regularly called “Dad” or “Daddy.” The jury convicted
Buda on three counts of endangering the welfare of a child and one
6
count of aggravated assault. N.M. did not testify at Buda’s trial, and
the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should not have
7
permitted Nurudeen to relay N.M.’s statements to the jury. Buda
claimed that the trial court’s decision to admit those statements into
evidence violated the right afforded to him by the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which states that “[i]n all criminal
∗
J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Fordham University. I would like to thank my family and friends, the members of the Seton Hall Law
Review, especially Keerthi Mundrati and Andrew Boulay, and Professor D. Michael
Risinger for their guidance, encouragement, and critique during the writing process.
1
T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1988).
2
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2008).
3
To protect the privacy of the child, his mother’s surname is omitted from the
opinion, and the court refers to the child by his initials. Id. at 765.
4
Id. at 766. While the defendant formally protested his innocence at trial, the
actus reus was not a practically triable issue—that is, it was virtually certain that
N.M.’s injuries had been sustained by physical abuse. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
5
Buda, 949 A.2d at 765.
6
Id. at 768.
7
Id.; see infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
8
with the witnesses against him.” On appeal, the Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court dismissed some of Buda’s claims but
agreed that Nurudeen’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause
9
and, therefore, reversed and remanded the case. Subsequently, both
Buda and the State petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for cer10
tification. The supreme court accepted the case and affirmed his
conviction, holding in a four-to-three decision that the defendant’s
11
confrontation right had not been violated.
The issue before the Buda court—the admission of N.M.’s out-ofcourt statements—implicated both evidentiary hearsay rules and the
rights afforded to a criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment to
12
the U.S. Constitution. Both are closely related in some aspects; most
notably, they both prohibit some out-of-court statements from being
13
14
admitted into evidence. In a 2004 case, Crawford v. Washington, the
Supreme Court of the United States directed lower courts to radically
alter the way in which they had been analyzing the relationship between hearsay and the Confrontation Clause for the previous quarter
15
century. In Crawford, the Court gave the somewhat elusive directive
that the Confrontation Clause should not apply to all hearsay but on16
ly to those statements made by “witnesses.” The identifying act of a
8

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 949 A.2d
761 (N.J. 2008).
10
Buda, 949 A.2d at 769. A petition for certification is a request that the New Jersey Supreme Court review the final judgment of the appellate division. See Supreme
Court of N.J., Guide to Filing an Appeal in Supreme Court,
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/guide.htm#petitioncert (last visited May
19, 2010). The defendant cross-petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court because
the appellate division decided that other incriminating statements that N.M. made to
his mother would be admissible into evidence on remand. See Buda, 912 A.2d at 740.
These issues are not the focus of this Comment.
11
Buda, 949 A.2d at 780.
12
Id. at 770.
13
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (“[H]earsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values . . . .”); see also
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (“It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same
roots.”).
14
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
15
See infra Part II for a discussion of the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and, specifically, how the Crawford decision changed the Court’s
longstanding approach.
16
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
9
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witness is the making of a so-called “testimonial” statement, and thus,
only witnesses make “testimonial” statements while other out-of-court
17
declarants do not. The Court stated that “testimonial” hearsay is inadmissible at a criminal trial unless the following two circumstances
are met: the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defense
18
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
19
In a later case, Davis v. Washington, the Court elaborated on the
definition of “testimonial” as it applies to statements made in re20
sponse to police “interrogations.” The Court held that statements
made in response to a police interrogation that is aimed at eliciting

17

Id. The author has placed quotation marks around the word testimonial
throughout this Comment because, as will be discussed infra Part V.B, the meaning
of testimonial in the Crawford sense is still not perfectly clear. Despite Crawford’s dependence on historical sources, the word testimonial was not used in the framing era
as a description of a type of hearsay. See Thomas Y. Davies, Not “‘The Framers’ Design”:
How the Framing-era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 369
(2007). Furthermore, in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court explained that
testimonial evidence refers to communicative evidence or assertions made by a human being. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966); see also Pennsylvania
v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 591 (1990) (distinguishing “real or physical” evidence from
“testimonial” evidence); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 201 (1988) (“[I]n order
to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”). Crawford and its progeny have given “testimonial” a very different, much narrower meaning, and thus, the quotation
marks are meant to signify the phrase “testimonial in the Crawford sense”—a phrase
that, if regularly used, would make this Comment inordinately awkward.
18
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
19
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
20
Id. The Court stated in Crawford that it was using the word “interrogation” in
its colloquial sense. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4. Interrogation was an odd word
choice to describe the dialogue in Davis. A police interrogation has a very specific
meaning—namely a systematic, planned series of questions initiated by the police
seeking inculpatory information from a criminal suspect to secure a conviction
against him at a later trial. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN
JUSTICE 11, 22 (2008); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (8th ed. 2004) (“The formal or systematic questioning of a person; esp., intensive questioning by the police,
usu. of a person arrested for or suspected of committing a crime.”). When police
conduct interrogations they usually use psychological tactics and strategies designed
to secure a confession from the suspect. See LEO, supra, at 119. A police interview,
on the other hand, is a distinct manner of questioning reserved for the innocent,
such as victims and witnesses. Id. at 22. Labeling the dialogue in Davis as an interrogation becomes even more perplexing because the Court had previously stated that
an interrogation is usually initiated by the police. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966) (defining an interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers”); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981) (noting that
if a suspect had initiated communication with the police, no “interrogation” would
occur).
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past facts relevant to a criminal prosecution are “testimonial,” whereas statements are “non-testimonial” when the purpose of the inter21
rogation is to resolve an ongoing emergency.
The Crawford and Davis opinions can be problematic for prosecutors of child abuse. For example, in New Jersey, DYFS workers are
required to investigate allegations of child abuse by interviewing the
22
victim, and the investigator may elicit statements from the child that
have probative evidentiary value for the criminal prosecution of the
abuser. The prosecution’s case against the defendant may hinge on
the admission of those statements into evidence, especially because
for several reasons, a child may not testify at trial to repeat his state23
ments to the jury firsthand. Furthermore, there is often little other
24
evidence against the accused besides the child’s pretrial statement.
Therefore, if a court determines that the child’s pretrial statement is
“testimonial,” then admitting that statement into evidence would be
25
constitutionally impermissible, which could seriously hamper the
prosecution’s case.
It is unclear whether the State would have been able to prove
that Buda was the perpetrator of the apparent abuse beyond a reasonable doubt without N.M.’s statements, and thus, the New Jersey
Supreme Court was faced with a situation similar to the one described above. This Comment argues that the Buda majority came to
the right conclusion—that N.M.’s statements were not “testimonial”—but for the wrong reasons. Specifically, the Buda majority mechanistically applied the holding of Davis in a manner unintended by

21
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). As will be discussed in more
detail infra Part V.B, the Court gave other indications about how a “testimonial”
statement can be identified—criteria that some have criticized as being vague and
inconsistent. See, e.g., Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: ‘Testimony’ Does Not
Mean Testimony and ‘Witness’ Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147,
169–70 (2006).
22
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-2.5(b) (2009) (“The child protective investigator
shall interview the alleged child victim in person and individually . . . .”).
23
See Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 985–92 (2007) (discussing the
various ways in which courts find children to be incompetent or unavailable).
24
See State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1334 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)
(“For obvious reasons, only one witness with personal knowledge is available to prove
the State’s case in almost every child abuse prosecution: the child victim.”).
25
See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 325 (Md. 2005) (finding statements
made by a child to a health and human services employee to be “testimonial” and
inadmissible); State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d,
949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).
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the U.S. Supreme Court. This Comment contends that the Buda
court could have justified its result by explaining that confrontation
was not required because N.M. lacked the competency to make a “testimonial” statement—that is, N.M. lacked the mental ability to be an
extrajudicial witness as described in Crawford. The making of a “testimonial” statement requires the declarant to objectively understand
that his statement could be used in a criminal prosecution. Given
N.M.’s age, mental development, and unfamiliarity with the judicial
system, he likely would not have been able to understand that his answers to Nurudeen’s questions could or might be used to convict Bu26
da.
In Part II, this Comment gives a brief explanation of the hearsay
rules as they relate to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.
Part III reviews of the factual background, procedural history, and
majority opinion of the Buda case. Part IV analyzes the majority’s approach and reasoning. Part V summarizes the criteria necessary to
26

The idea of extrajudicial “testimonial” competency has been raised both explicitly and implicitly by judges and commentators, and the author agrees that it is the
most persuasive argument supporting the theory that some very young children, such
as N.M., are unable to make “testimonial” statements. See Rebecca K. Connally, “Out
of the Mouth[s] of Babes”: Can Young Children Even Bear Testimony?, ARMY LAW., Mar.
2008, at 1, 18–19 (noting that “[s]ome young children are incapable of making testimonial statements because they either lack the competency or capacity to ‘bear witness’”); Matthew M. Staab, Child’s Play: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Crawford v. Washington
in Child Abuse Prosecution, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 501, 522 (2005) (“[I]t is doubtful whether a trial court could find, on one hand, that a child is incompetent to testify at trial
but, on the other hand, that the same child at an earlier time could make a testimonial statement which he reasonably believed could be used at a future trial.”).
Some courts, without referring specifically to the phrase “testimonial” competency,
have touched on the issue. See, e.g., State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255–56
(Minn. 2006) (“[G]iven [the child’s] very young age, it is doubtful that he was even
capable of understanding that his statements would be used at a trial. . . . [C]hildren
of [a very young age] are simply unable to understand the legal system and the consequences of statements made during the legal process. . . . An interview with an
older child who understands the law-enforcement consequences of his statement, or
an interview with more significant law-enforcement involvement might both exhibit a
greater purpose on the part of a declarant or government questioner to produce
statements for use at a future trial.”). Professor Richard D. Friedman, who helped
spark the Crawford Court’s decision to overturn Roberts, proposed the idea that very
young children were incapable of acting as witnesses because they would not be
aware at the time they made the statements that their words would lead to the punishment of the abuser. See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 250 (2002) [hereinafter
Friedman, Conundrum]; see also Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of
“Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005) (noting that “some very young children should be considered incapable of being witnesses for Confrontation Clause
purposes”).
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make a “testimonial” statement and then explains what those criteria
indicate about “testimonial” competency. Specifically, “testimonial”
competency requires that the declarant have the mental ability to infer from the circumstances that his statement could be used in a
criminal prosecution. In the Buda case, N.M. was unable to do so.
Part VI suggests a procedure that should be followed for child-abuse
prosecutions that would protect children and ensure a fair trial for
the defendant. This Comment concludes by placing the Buda decision into perspective with the state of the law on child hearsay and
the Confrontation Clause. It also calls for more definitive guidance
from the Supreme Court about how this issue should be handled in
the future.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Relationship Between Hearsay and the Right to Confrontation
In criminal trials, two issues become relevant when the prosecution attempts to introduce an out-of-court statement made by a declarant who is not present to testify. First, an extrajudicial statement
may be considered hearsay, which is defined as a “statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hear27
ing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
28
The general rule is that hearsay is inadmissible at trial. While the
origins of the hearsay rule are somewhat unclear—in fact, there was
29
no established rule against it in criminal practice until the 1700s —
two generally accepted reasons are given as to why the hearsay rule
was established: (1) a preference for live testimony under oath and
30
(2) subjecting the witness to cross-examination.

27

FED. R. EVID. 801. For purposes of this Comment, the author will refer and cite
mainly to the Federal Rules of Evidence and at times to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. Hearsay can be distinguished from statements that are not used to prove the
truth of the matter asserted but are offered for some other reason, such as proving
the statement’s effect on a person. See id. advisory committee’s note (“If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised
as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”).
28
Id. 802; N.J.R.E. 802. The hearsay rule is concededly riddled with exceptions.
See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 806; see also infra notes 31–34.
29
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 242 (2003).
30
See id. at 245–47 (citing several treatises that indicate that the rationale for having a hearsay rule shifted from a desire for testimony under oath to the need for
cross-examination).
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In the federal system and in the states, however, several exceptions to the hearsay rule permit the prosecution to admit a statement
31
made by a person not present to testify at trial. The New Jersey
Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence divide hearsay
exceptions into two categories: (1) those applicable regardless of the
declarant’s availability to testify at trial and (2) those applicable only
32
when the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. The former set
of exceptions is premised on the grounds that they “possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduc33
tion of the declarant in person at the trial.” The unavailable witness
exceptions follow the theory that, although live testimony is preferred, the circumstances under which the out-of-court statement was
34
made meets a certain guarantee of reliability.
In addition to the hearsay rules of evidence, a prosecutor may also face a constitutional challenge to the admission of an extrajudicial
statement. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
35
against him.” The Confrontation Clause is a right granted to criminal defendants with the purpose of determining the truth at trial by
discouraging perjury by prosecution witnesses who, for one reason or
another, would not be able to lie (effectively) in front of the defendant. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause entitles the defendant
to hear the all of the prosecution’s evidence against him and provides
36
him an opportunity for cross-examination. While these may be the
goals of confrontation, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
there is scant firsthand proof of how the Framers intended the
37
amendment to operate in practice, and as a result, several interpretations exist.
For example, one extreme reading of the clause is that the confrontation right has no relation to hearsay statements at all and that

31

See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804; N.J.R.E. 803, 804.
See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804; N.J.R.E. 803, 804.
33
FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note.
34
Id. 804 advisory committee’s note.
35
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36
See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641,
688–89 (1996).
37
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause.”).
32
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the phrase “witnesses against” refers only to witnesses who actually
38
testify at trial. Under this reading, the clause simply requires that a
criminal defendant be present during an adverse witness’s testimo39
ny; it would not affect the admission of an out-of-court statement.
While the Court has rejected this interpretation, it has also rejected
the opposite extreme—that the Confrontation Clause was simply a
40
constitutional prohibition of all hearsay from criminal trials. Because the Court has determined that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are neither completely distinct nor identical, it has attempted to explain that there will be some situations in which the
prosecution will need to pass two obstacles before it can admit a hearsay statement into evidence: the evidentiary hearsay rule and a constitutional Confrontation Clause challenge. While the prosecution will
always need to find an evidentiary exception to admit hearsay into
evidence, there will also be some situations in which a defendant raises a constitutional challenge that can be overcome only if the prosecution can demonstrate that the admission of the statement will not
41
violate the Confrontation Clause. As discussed below, the Supreme
Court has struggled to establish a clear and long-lasting rule to explain which hearsay statements are subject to the constitutional obstacle.

38

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (citations omitted).
See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan stated,
If one were to translate the Confrontation Clause into language in
more common use today, it would read: “In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to be present and to cross-examine
the witnesses against him.” Nothing in this language or in its 18thcentury equivalent would connote a purpose to control the scope of
the rules of evidence. The language is particularly ill-chosen if what
was intended was a prohibition on the use of any hearsay . . . .
Id.
40
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation
Clause was not meant to prohibit all hearsay, as such an interpretation “would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too
extreme”); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“[N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth
Amendment’s core concerns.”).
41
See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986) (recognizing that a coconspirator’s statement was properly admitted under a hearsay exception but could
not be admitted into evidence because it would violate the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation).
39
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Roberts and its Effect on Child-Abuse Prosecutions

B

42

In a 1980 case, Ohio v. Roberts, fifteen years after the Confrontation Clause was made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
43
Amendment, the Supreme Court established a test for lower courts
to apply when determining whether a hearsay statement could be
44
admitted into evidence without violating the Confrontation Clause.
The Court stated,
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing
that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only
if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence
must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
45
guarantees of trustworthiness.

Roberts and its progeny established two important points about
the Court’s understanding of the Confrontation Clause. First, the
Court seems to have construed the Confrontation Clause’s words
46
“witnesses against” to include all hearsay declarants. Second, the
opinion strengthened the relationship between evidentiary hearsay
rules and the Sixth Amendment; as long as a statement fell into a
47
“firmly rooted” hearsay exception or proved to be trustworthy, it
could be admitted without any constitutional violation.

42

448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
44
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
45
Id. at 46. The Court later clarified in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986),
and White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), that under Roberts, the Confrontation
Clause did not require a showing of unavailability as a condition of admitting some
hearsay statements into evidence.
46
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (stating in a Roberts-era case that “a declarant [is] undoubtedly as much a ‘witness against’
a defendant as one who actually testifies at trial”).
47
The Roberts court did not define the term “firmly rooted,” but it did give the
following examples of such exceptions: dying declarations, previously cross-examined
former testimony, and appropriately administered business and public records. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8. But without a concrete definition or set of criteria for determining “firmly rooted” exceptions, lower courts subsequently struggled to identify
them. See Stanley A. Goldman, Not So “Firmly Rooted”: Exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3, 11–16 (1987) (criticizing the label of “firmly rooted” and
discussing lower courts’ various interpretations of the term). Adding to the confusion is the fact that one of the Court’s given examples, properly administered business records, was not recognized at common law and has its origins in the Common43
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Subsequent to the Roberts decision, prosecutors were able to bypass both the evidentiary and constitutional impediments to admit48
ting children’s hearsay by using residual hearsay exceptions, newly
49
formed “tender-years” hearsay exceptions, and other hearsay excep50
tions that had sufficient indicia of reliability. The ability to admit
children’s pretrial statements proved beneficial to child-abuse prosecutors because those statements were often very important for a successful prosecution. The statements’ importance is due to the fact
that, frequently, the child victim is the only individual other than the
abuser who has firsthand knowledge about the abuse, making the
51
child’s information an essential piece of evidence.
Moreover, a
child may potentially be prevented from testifying at trial for two reawealth Fund Act of 1927, a year not too long ago. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory
committee’s note.
48
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807 (“A statement not specifically covered by [another
hearsay exception] but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.”).
49
Tender-years exceptions are defined as “hearsay exception[s] for an out-ofcourt statement [of a young child], usually describing an act of physical or sexual
abuse, when the child is unavailable to testify and the court determines that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement make it reliable.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 790 (9th ed. 2009). New Jersey was one of many states that passed a tender-years hearsay exception. See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) (stating that “[a] statement by a
child under the age of 12 relating to sexual misconduct committed with or against
that child is admissible in a criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding if” certain elements
of reliability are met). The age of “tender years” must be distinguished from both
the age of legal infancy, or minority, and the age at which it is unlikely a child would
be competent to testify. A minor is a person who has not yet reached the full legal
age of majority, which is usually eighteen. See 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 10 (2000). The
age of “tender years” is younger than the legal age of infancy, usually ten or twelve.
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 81
(West, Westlaw through ch. 30 of 2010 2nd Ann. Sess.); N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27). Some
states have a rebuttable age of presumed incompetency and others have no presumptive age but set forth guidelines for courts to use in determining competency. See
generally 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses §§ 203, 204, 208–211 (2004).
50
See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (holding that no confrontation
violation occurred by admitting a child’s hearsay statements under a spontaneousdeclaration hearsay exception and a medical-treatment exception because they were
sufficiently reliable).
51
See State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667, 672 (N.J. 1988) (“Courts, legislatures, and
commentators that have focused on the problems of proof in child sex abuse prosecutions appear to agree that testimony by the victim is often the indispensable element of the prosecution’s case.”).
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sons: First, the court can excuse a child from testifying if it finds the
child is unavailable due to the potential trauma he may face as a re52
sult of giving testimony in front of the alleged abuser. In addition,
53
the child must be formally competent to testify, and if he is not, the
54
court will preclude the child from giving testimony. Under Roberts,
however, even if the child did not testify, prosecutors still were able to
admit the child’s extrajudicial statement if the court found that it met

52
See, e.g., T.P. v. State, 911 So. 2d 1117, 1120 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Rangel v.
State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 529–32 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding six-year-old child to be unavailable because giving courtroom testimony would be too traumatic). Some commentators make the argument that requiring a child to repeat accounts of the abuse,
especially in front of the abuser, can be detrimental to the child’s psychological wellbeing and can result in unreliable testimony. See Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill,
Note, Videotaping Children’s Testimony: An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809, 820–21
(1987) (noting that the fear of confronting an abuser and the hostility of the courtroom can have long-lasting effects on the child and may lead to inaccurate courtroom testimony). But equally dangerous consequences can result from admitting
unreliable children’s hearsay. Studies have shown that children can be very susceptible to the suggestiveness of the interviewer. See Amye R. Warren & Dorothy F. Marsil,
Why Children’s Suggestibility Remains a Serious Concern, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127,
127–31 (2002). In addition, young children have been found to make false accusations of abuse when an interviewer gives the children positive reinforcement for
some answers but not others, and children also may make false accusations when alleged victims speak with one another and share information about the alleged abuse.
Id. at 131–32. During the Roberts era, several infamous examples of cases were decided where the manner of pretrial questioning of children was found to be unduly
suggestive or coercive, including the New Jersey case, State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372
(N.J. 1994). In Michaels, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s conviction for sexual abuse because the investigators had asked the potential childvictims leading questions. Id. at 1383. The investigators also furnished information
to the children that the children had not voluntarily offered. Id. at 1380. Another
infamous example of a problematic / suggestive interview is the California “McMartin
Preschool case.” Satz v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1525 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
These are two notorious examples, and undoubtedly, numerous other cases exist in
which the investigation was coercive and suggestive, leading to false or inaccurate accusations that were used in a criminal trial.
53
See N.J.R.E. 601; 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 201 (2004). The word “testimonially” could have been used in place of the word “formally” because competency is a
measure of a person’s ability to testify or give testimony. To avoid confusion with the
term “testimonial” in the Crawford sense, the author has chosen to use the word
“formal” to refer to a witness’s competence to give testimony at trial. See supra note
17.
54
See, e.g., State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1987) (ruling that a three-year-old did
not understand the duty to tell the truth, thus making her incompetent to testify).
Courts apply a number of factors when determining the formal competence of a witness, including the witness’s ability to understand the oath or affirmation to speak
the truth and the witness’s ability to communicate with the jury. See N.J.R.E. 601.
This element of competency is discussed in more detail infra Part V.A.
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the effect of a nontestifying child.
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which essentially mitigated

C. The Crawford Decision
In 2004 the Supreme Court dramatically changed its Confronta56
tion Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington. In Crawford,
the Court eschewed the Roberts reliability framework and articulated a
new approach to the Confrontation Clause’s relationship to hearsay.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first attacked the Roberts rule as
being unpredictable, overly subjective, and unfaithful to the Framers’
57
intent. He then explained that the term “witnesses,” as it is used in
the Sixth Amendment, refers only to those individuals who make “tes58
timonial” statements and that other hearsay declarants—those who
do not make “testimonial” statements—are not witnesses for Con59
frontation Clause purposes. Consequently, if a hearsay statement is
“nontestimonial,” it can be admitted via a hearsay exception without
violating the defendant’s confrontation rights; however, if the hearsay
statement is “testimonial,” it can only be admitted if the witness is
present on the witness stand, or (1) the declarant is unavailable to
testify at trial and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to
60
cross-examine the witness.
Crawford was significant for several reasons. First, it considerably
narrowed the scope of the Confrontation Clause by limiting its reach
to declarants making “testimonial” statements—a much smaller sample of hearsay declarants than the Court’s previous jurisprudence,
55

See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
57
Id. at 61–65. Justice Thomas, who was joined by Justice Scalia, voiced his displeasure with the Roberts framework in his concurring opinion in White v. Illinois,
where he “respectfully suggest[ed] that, in an appropriate case, we reconsider how
the phrase ‘witness against’ in the Confrontation Clause pertains to the admission of
hearsay.” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992). (Thomas, J., concurring). The
Crawford Court seems to have been partially influenced by the writings of Professor
Richard Friedman. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (citing Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998)). Professor Friedman suggested in this article that the Court adopt a new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
using an “alternative approach, detached from hearsay law and based instead on the
idea that the Confrontation Clause gives the defendant a right to confront adverse
witnesses—those who make testimonial statements.” Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1013 (1998).
58
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; see supra note 17.
59
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68.
60
Id. at 68.
56
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which considered all hearsay declarants to be witnesses for Confron61
tation Clause purposes. Second, Crawford extricated the Confronta62
tion Clause from evidentiary hearsay rules. The Roberts rule, which
married the reasons that would permit a statement to be admissible
for evidentiary purposes with the reasons why it would be admissible
63
for constitutional purposes, would no longer control whether a
hearsay statement violates the Confrontation Clause; as the Court
proclaimed, “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not
think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection
to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous no64
tions of ‘reliability.’” After Crawford, therefore, lower courts were directed to no longer consider the reliability of a hearsay statement
when deciding whether the Constitution prohibited its admission but
65
rather to consider only its “testimonial” nature.
A third salient point about Crawford is that it emphasized that the
Confrontation Clause was not aimed at admitting substantively reliable evidence but was rather concerned with the procedure by which
66
the jury could determine reliability—face-to-face cross-examination.
By emphasizing this point, however, Justice Scalia implied that the
Confrontation Clause imposes a social and moral obligation on some
hearsay declarants that serves an atavistic purpose of requiring accusers to gather the courage to stand by their previous accusatory assertions as they face the accused.
This implication can be gleaned from Justice Scalia’s words and
the tone of his arguments. For example, to support his argument in
Crawford, Justice Scalia uses the famous case of Sir Walter Raleigh,
whose alleged accomplice in treason, Lord Cobham, made incrimi67
nating statements about Raleigh—but not during Raleigh’s trial.
Justice Scalia quotes Raleigh as saying, “[L]et Cobham be here, let
68
him speak it. Call my accuser before my face.” In addition, consider the
following remarks that Justice Scalia made in a pre-Crawford case:
“[T]here is something deep in human nature that regards face-toface confrontation between accused and accuser as ‘essential to a fair
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
Crawford, 541 U.S at 61.
See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
See id. at 51–53.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 44.
Id. (emphasis added).
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trial in a criminal prosecution.’”
senhower, he added,
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Quoting President Dwight D. Ei-

“[M]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree. You could
not sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him,
without suffering the penalty of an outraged citizenry. . . . In this
country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up
70
in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow.”

Furthermore, he stated that “Shakespeare was thus describing
the root meaning of confrontation when he had Richard the Second
say: ‘Then call them to our presence—face to face, and frowning brow to
71
brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak.’”
These quotes demonstrate an approach to the Confrontation Clause
that suggests it is not simply a defendant’s right, but that it also places
a moral and ethical obligation on those who make accusatory state72
ments.
D. Davis and the Meaning of “Testimonial”
The Crawford court left “for another day any effort to spell out a
73
comprehensive definition of the term ‘testimonial.’”
That day
came, partially, in 2006 when the Court decided the combined cases
74
of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana. In Davis, the issue
before the Court was whether certain statements made to a 911 telephone operator in the midst of a domestic-violence dispute were “tes75
timonial.” By contrast, in Hammon, the issue also involved state69

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
404 (1965)).
70
Id. at 1017–18 (quoting President Dwight Eisenhower, Remarks Given to the
B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League (Nov. 23, 1953)) (emphasis added).
71
Id. at 1016 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
72
See generally Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation
Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258 (2003). Clark argues that the Confrontation Clause
should be interpreted as a moral and social obligation that is imposed on those who
act as accusers and not simply as a right belonging to the accused. Id. at 1258. He
explains that “the confrontation right might be best understood in conjunction with
the oath requirement [and] [t]he oath taken by a witness in a criminal trial may . . .
serve a way of requiring witnesses to put themselves on the line.” Id. at 1267.
73
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. In a footnote following that statement, the Court
noted that “this case will cause interim uncertainty.” Id. at 68 n.10.
74
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
75
An abbreviated version of the dialogue between the 911 operator and the victim, Michelle McCottry:
911 Operator: What’s going on?
Complainant: He’s here jumpin’ on me again.
....
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ments made by a domestic-violence victim; however, she made the
statements after the altercation ended when the police were physically present at the scene to question the couple, and, moreover, the po76
lice had the victim fill out and sign an affidavit about the altercation.
The Court used the following rule to make its decisions:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later crim77
inal prosecution.

Accordingly, the Court held that the statements made in Davis to
the 911 operator were “nontestimonial” because they described
events that were presently happening and the purpose of the ques78
tion and answer dialogue was to resolve an ongoing emergency. But
in Hammon, the Court found that the statements were “testimonial”

911 Operator: Are there any weapons?
Complainant: No. He’s usin’ his fists.
....
911 Operator: Okay, sweetie. I’ve got help started. Stay on the line
with me, okay?
....
911 Operator: Listen to me carefully. Do you know his last name?
Complainant: It’s Davis.
Id. at 817–18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76
Id. at 819–20. In Hammon, the police responded to a house where a reported
domestic disturbance had occurred, and when they arrived on the scene they separated the apparent victim, Amy Hammon, from her husband Hershell. Id. at 819.
The officers questioned Amy and had her write and sign the following statement:
“‘Broke our Furnace & shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass. Hit me
in the chest and threw me down. Broke our lamps & phone. Tore up my van where
I couldn’t leave the house. Attacked my daughter.’” Id. at 819–20 (citation omitted).
The lower court held that Amy Hammon’s signed affidavit was “testimonial,” but her
statements to the officers were not and, therefore, were admissible. Id. at 821.
77
Id. at 822. Justice Thomas made a very thoughtful point in his dissent that is
relevant to the Buda case: “Assigning one of these two ‘largely unverifiable motives
[protection and obtaining evidence],’ primacy requires constructing a hierarchy of
purpose that will rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible. It will inevitably
be, quite simply, an exercise in fiction.” Id. at 839 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
78
Id. at 827. While the Supreme Court focuses on the circumstances surrounding the “interrogation,” the Court indicates that a “testimonial” statement can be
made in other contexts as well. Id. at 822 n.1.
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because no ongoing emergency existed and the questions were de79
signed to elicit facts about past criminal conduct.
E. Crawford’s Effect on the Admissibility of Child Hearsay
The Crawford decision poses obstacles to child-abuse prosecu80
tions that did not exist when courts followed the Roberts rule. Because a statement may be “testimonial” even if it is very reliable, the
same trustworthy or firmly rooted hearsay exceptions that prosecutors
utilized to overcome constitutional challenges under Roberts are no
81
longer useful under Crawford. For example, in State v. Snowden, the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the admission of two children’s
extrajudicial statements to a Department of Health and Human Services investigator violated the Confrontation Clause because they
were “testimonial,” notwithstanding the fact that they had been ad82
mitted under the state’s tender-years hearsay exception. The court
found that in light of Crawford’s new rule, the fact that the children’s
statements satisfied the reliability criteria of the state’s tender-years
exception was irrelevant; because the statements were “testimonial,”
the Confrontation Clause prohibited their admission into evidence
83
without the children testifying.
After Crawford, a substantial number of courts have held that
children’s extrajudicial statements to social workers were “testimoni84
al” and, therefore, inadmissible. Of concern to prosecutors and so79

Id. at 829–30. As will be discussed in more detail infra Part V.B, the term “testimonial” has been a source of great controversy and criticism even after the Davis
decision. While a plethora of articles have been written about the meaning of “testimonial,” a well-written collection can be found in Regent University Law Review’s
2006–2007 Symposium. Symposium, Confrontation Clause, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 303
(2006–2007).
80
See Mosteller, supra note 23, at 957 (noting that hearsay statements that would
have been admissible under Roberts may “run contrary to [Crawford’s] restrictions on
testimonial hearsay”). Consider also the case of Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406
(2007), where the defendant was convicted in 1993 for child abuse based partially on
the fact that the victim’s hearsay was admitted into evidence. After Crawford was
handed down, the defendant argued that the admission of these statements violated
the Confrontation Clause because they were “testimonial.” Id. at 414. This case
makes clear that, at least theoretically, children’s hearsay was more easily admitted
under Roberts than under Crawford. The Court ruled, however, that Crawford was not
to be applied retroactively and sustained the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 409.
81
867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005).
82
Id. at 325. The children were ten and eight years old, respectively. Id. at 316.
83
See id. at 325.
84
See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005); T.P. v. State,
911 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal.
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cial workers is the fact that courts have been employing inconsistent
85
rationales to determine whether a child’s statement is “testimonial.”
For example, courts have used one or more of the following as the
determinative factor: whether a reasonable child would anticipate the
86
prosecutorial use of the statement, whether an objective adult would
87
anticipate the prosecutorial use of the statement, and whether the
questioner’s purpose was to gather past facts that are potentially rele88
vant to a future prosecution. Others make the determination based
on the formality of any questioning and the involvement of govern89
ment personnel. This inconsistency has led to at least one formal
request for the Supreme Court to provide further guidance on the
issue of child-victim hearsay and the criteria for determining when a
Ct. App. 2004); People v. Sharp, 155 P.3d 577 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2008); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006); State v.
Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558; (N.D. 2006); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004); State v.
Pitt, 147 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
85
See Brief for the States of Missouri et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Iowa v. Bentley, 128 S. Ct. 1655 (2008) (No. 07-886), 2008 WL 534802 [hereinafter Missouri Brief] (petitioning the Supreme Court to establish concrete guidelines
on the issue of the admissibility of child hearsay made to social workers); see also
Connally, supra note 26, at 4–12; Mosteller, supra note 23, at 944, 976–84 (noting that
“lower courts are engaged in [an] analysis based upon . . . limited information . . . .
[and] [w]hen the results are relatively consistent, they might be seen as reasonable
judicial interpretation in a situation of ambiguity”).
86
See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 924–25 (Colo. 2006).
[A]ssessment of whether or not a reasonable person in the position of
the declarant would believe a statement would be available for use at a
later trial involves an analysis of the expectations of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant. Expectations derive from circumstances, and, among other circumstances, a person’s age is a pertinent
characteristic for analysis.
Id. at 925.
87
See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(“Conceivably, the Supreme Court’s reference to an ‘objective witness’ should be
taken to mean an objective witness in the same category of persons as the actual witness—here, an objective four year old. But we do not think so. It is more likely that
the Supreme Court meant simply that if the statement was given under circumstances in which its use in a prosecution is reasonably foreseeable by an objective observer, then the statement is testimonial.”).
88
See, e.g., State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 564 (N.D. 2006) (holding that the forensic interviewer’s law-enforcement purpose was dispositive, notwithstanding the
fact the child was four years old); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004) (holding a
three-year-old child’s statements were “testimonial” because the Department of Human Services employee conducting the interview was attempting to elicit statements
that were to be used in a criminal prosecution).
89
See, e.g., People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a
child’s statement “nontestimonial” because it was made to a private individual as opposed to a government employee).
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90

statement to a social worker is “testimonial.” As of the time of publication, the Supreme Court has not accepted a case involving Crawford’s affect on child hearsay.
III. STATE V. BUDA

91

N.M.’s mother, Christine, was still a teenager when she gave
92
birth to N.M. in 1998. In 2002 Christine began dating the defen93
dant, Ryan Buda. Soon afterwards, she and N.M. moved out of her
94
parents’ home and in with Buda.
Christine’s sister regularly babysat N.M. at Christine’s parents’
95
house while Christine was at work. In July 2002, while Christine was
driving N.M. to drop him off with her sister, the three-year-old told
96
her, “‘Daddy beat me.’” Christine responded by asking when Buda
97
had beat him, and N.M. told her “‘the nighttime.’” That same day,
Christine’s mother called her to inform her that N.M. had bruises on
98
his buttocks that resembled handprints. Later that day, Christine
asked Buda about the bruises, and he claimed that N.M. incurred
99
them when he fell down in the bathtub. Christine accepted this explanation and believed it again two months later when she learned
100
that N.M. had bruises on his head.
On October 16, 2002, Christine’s sister was babysitting N.M.
101
while Christine was working. Usually Christine picked N.M. up, but
102
Buda picked N.M. up that day. When he arrived, N.M. started cry103
ing and refused to leave the house with Buda. At that point, Christine’s sister accused Buda of abusing N.M., and an argument en90

See Missouri Brief, supra note 85, at *2 (“It is critical for those courts to have
concrete, uniform guidance . . . as to how to determine the admissibility of a child’s
out-of-court statement made to child welfare advocates.”)
91
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J 2008).
92
Id. at 765.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.; see infra text accompanying note 5. This statement may be referred to later
in the Comment as “the July statement.”
97
Buda, 949 A.2d at 765.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 765–66.
101
Id. at 766.
102
Id.
103
Buda, 949 A.2d at 766.
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105

sued.
The police came to the house, and “after a phone call to
106
107
Christine,” the police had to physically carry N.M. into Buda’s car.
Two days later, on October 18, Christine left N.M. with Buda in108
stead of with her family while she was at work. When she returned
from work, N.M. was calmly watching television and Buda was in the
109
house nearby. About an hour after her arrival, Christine noticed a
large red mark on the back of N.M.’s neck, at which point she became frantic, and she and Buda rushed N.M. to the emergency
110
room.
At the hospital, Christine asked Buda what happened to
N.M., and Buda responded that he did not know and that N.M.
111
“‘must have fallen.’”
N.M. was immediately examined by a doctor in the presence of
112
The treating physician at the hospital found
Christine’s parents.
that N.M. had serious injuries to his scalp, ears, eyes, and neck, as well
as several other smaller injuries to his scrotum and flank—injuries
that led the doctor to believe that N.M. had been subjected to physi113
cal abuse.
The doctor reported his findings to DYFS’s Office of
114
Child Abuse Control and the Dover Township Police Department.
The police department then contacted the Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, and Investigator Kenneth Hess, who is a member of the
Child Abuse/Sexual Assault Unit, arrived at the hospital around 8:45
115
p.m.
Later that evening, Miriam Nurudeen, a member of DYFS’s
116
Special Response Unit, arrived at the hospital. Hess and Nurudeen

104

Id.
Id. The opinion is unclear about who actually called the police.
106
Id. The opinion is also unclear about who spoke with Christine and what exactly she said. A reasonable inference is that the police officers spoke with Christine,
who then told them that Buda had permission to take N.M. from her sister’s house.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Buda, 949 A.2d at 766.
110
Id. Christine’s parents were apparently notified about N.M.’s injuries and
came to the hospital to be with N.M, but the opinion is unclear about who notified
them.
111
Id. at 766.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 767. N.M. was ultimately hospitalized for two weeks for internal bleeding. Id. at 766.
114
Id. at 781.
115
Buda, 949 A.2d at 781.
116
Id. at 767.
105
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met to discuss how they should proceed with interviewing N.M.
Hess decided that Nurudeen should interview N.M. because Hess was
118
interviewing Buda.
Nurudeen entered N.M.’s hospital room and asked his grandpa119
rents to leave the room while she questioned N.M. The pertinent
part the interview is as follows:
Nurudeen: “Okay. I understand you fell. How did you fall?”
N.M.: “From my bed.”
Nurudeen: “What were you doing?”
N.M.: [No answer]
Nurudeen: “Did anybody hit you? Did anybody beat you?”
N.M.: “Dad says nobody beat me. I fell when I was sleeping in my
120
room.”

A. Procedural History
Buda was eventually charged with three counts of endangering
121
the welfare of a child and one count of assault. Although apparent122
ly available, N.M. did not testify at trial, but Christine, the treating
123
physician, and Nurudeen testified for the prosecution. After a pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of N.M.’s hearsay state124
ments, the trial court concluded that both the July statement, in
which N.M. told his mother that “Daddy beat me” and the October
statements made to Nurudeen fell under New Jersey’s “excited utterance” hearsay exception and were therefore admissible into evi125
dence. The trial court also concluded that Crawford would not pre117

Id. at 781.
Id. Nurudeen indicated that prosecutors normally interview the child first and
sometimes the DYFS investigator and the prosecutor interview the child together. Id.
119
Id. at 781–82.
120
Id. at 782. These statements may be collectively referred to as “the October
statements” in the remainder of this Comment.
121
Buda, 949 A.2d at 767. Christine was also charged with one count of seconddegree endangering the welfare of a child, which the state later reduced to one
count of fourth-degree cruelty and neglect of a child, in exchange for her cooperation and testimony against Buda. Id. at 767 n.3.
122
Id. at 767, 783.
123
Id. at 767.
124
N.J.R.E. 104.
125
Buda, 949 A.2d at 768; see also N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) (stating that an excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition and without
opportunity to deliberate or fabricate”). The admission of excited utterances is not
conditioned on the availability of the declarant, which explains why the prosecutor
118
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vent N.M.’s statements from being admitted into evidence.
Buda
127
was eventually convicted of all charges.
Buda challenged his conviction on several grounds, most notably
that the admission of both the July and the October statements vi128
olated the Confrontation Clause. On appeal, the appellate division
held that while both sets of statements were excited utterances and
thus passed the evidentiary bar against hearsay statements, N.M.’s
statements to Nurudeen were “testimonial” and constitutionally in129
admissible.
The appellate division rejected Buda’s claim that the
July statement to Christine was “testimonial” and, accordingly, held
that the statement that “Daddy beat me” was properly admitted into
130
evidence.
After the appellate division reversed and remanded the
case, both Buda and the State petitioned the New Jersey Supreme
131
Court for certification, which was granted.
B. The New Jersey Supreme Court
The State argued that the appellate division erred in concluding
that the October statements were “testimonial” because (1) neither
N.M. nor anyone similarly situated would have expected the statements to have been used in a criminal prosecution, and (2) Nurudeen’s primary purpose in questioning N.M. was to protect him, not
132
to elicit evidence of past facts. Buda argued that the appellate divi-

did not have to demonstrate that N.M. was unavailable to testify as a prerequisite to
admitting N.M.’s hearsay. See id. See also infra note 130 for a discussion regarding
the decision to label N.M.’s statements as an excited utterances. Notably, N.M.’s
statement would not qualify for New Jersey’s tender-years hearsay exception because
that exception requires the child to be a victim of sexual abuse, and no such allegation was made in this case. See N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).
126
Buda, 949 A.2d at 776–77. The Davis case had not even been argued before
the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of Buda’s trial. Id. at 777 n.6.
127
Id. at 768.
128
Id. at 768. Buda also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the
guilty verdict, that certain jury instructions were in error, and that his sentence was
improper. Id.
129
State v. Buda, 912 A.2d. 735, 745 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (“The October statement . . . was taken when N.M. was no longer in danger and there was no
‘ongoing emergency.’ As a result the statement must be deemed testimonial . . . .”
(citation omitted)), rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008).
130
Id. at 746 n.11.
131
Buda, 949 A.2d at 769.
132
Id.
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sion erred when it decided that N.M.’s July statements to Christine
133
were admissible as excited utterances and were not “testimonial.”
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, began its legal analysis by stating that “we address first whether N.M.’s
hearsay statements to his mother or the DYFS worker qualify as excited utterances . . . . We then turn to whether those statements are
134
‘testimonial’ within the meaning of Crawford and Davis.” After the
Buda majority held that the trial court had not abused its discretion
in concluding that both statements met the evidentiary requirements
135
of New Jersey’s excited-utterance hearsay exception, the court addressed each statement to determine if its admission had violated the
136
Confrontation Clause. The court, relying on the Crawford decision,
reasoned that N.M.’s statement to Christine that “Daddy beat me” was
not “testimonial” because it was more analogous to a “‘casual remark
to an acquaintance,’ than to a statement in response to a ‘formal
137
statement [given] to government officers.’”
133

Id.
Id. at 770.
135
Id. at 773. While this Comment deals specifically with the analysis of N.M.’s
statement to Nurudeen and whether its admission at trial violated the Confrontation
Clause, the majority surprisingly held that N.M.’s statements to Christine and Nurudeen were excited utterances. Id. The elements of an excited utterance in New Jersey are (1) a statement relating to a startling event or condition; (2) made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; (3)
without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate. See State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673, 689
(N.J. 2003) (citing N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2)). The three Buda dissenters vigorously argued
that neither N.M.’s statements to Christine nor his statements to Nurudeen met the
elements of an excited utterance. Buda, 949 A.2d at 781, 787 (Albin, J., dissenting).
The dissent pointed out that to be considered an excited utterance, the elicited
statement must be related to the startling event at issue—in this case, alleged physical
abuse. Id. at 782 n.2. Thus, the dissent explains that
for [N.M.’s] responses to [Nurudeen] to be “excited utterances,”
[N.M.] must have been under the continuing stress and excitement
caused by the beating, not caused by the mother’s discovery of the
child’s injury, which the majority describes as the “intervening actionfilled chaos.” The “intervening action filled chaos” is not a substitute
for the startling event.
Id. (citation omitted). The dissent also argued that the July statement did not meet
the elements of an excited utterance because there was no concrete evidence of
when N.M. had last been abused, and thus, it seems as if he had time to deliberate
and that he was not under the stress of a “startling event.” Id. at 787–88.
136
Id. at 773 (majority opinion). This section addresses only the majority’s opinion. See infra Part IV for certain arguments the dissent makes about the majority
opinion.
137
Id. at 777–78 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 53–54 (2004)).
The Crawford Court made clear that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to
134
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The court then addressed the most controversial issue of the
case—the statements N.M. made to Nurudeen in the hospital, which
138
the majority held were not “testimonial.”
The Buda majority used
139
the Davis decision to guide its resolution of the issue and attempted
to assign Nurudeen one of two possible purposes while she was questioning N.M.: (1) resolving a life-threatening emergency or (2) ga140
thering past facts relevant to a potential criminal prosecution. The
majority believed that Nurudeen’s purpose fell neatly into the for141
mer.
In the court’s words, Nurudeen’s primary purpose was “to
end defendant’s then-present reign of terror over N.M., [who made]
a statement no different than the domestic abuse victim’s 911 call
142
Davis instructs is nontestimonial.”
Not only did the Buda majority believe that Nurudeen’s primary
purpose was to protect N.M., but it also argued that Nurudeen had
absolutely no prosecutorial purpose and that a clear separation of duties existed between her and the county prosecutor, Investigator
Hess. The court stated,
Here the DYFS worker was doing precisely her job: she was not
collecting information about past events for prosecutorial purposes, but gathering data in order to assure a child’s future wellbeing. Indeed, by the time she arrived at the hospital, an investigator from the Prosecutor’s Office already was there. The division of duties [at the hospital] was clear: while the Prosecutor’s
Office investigator was charged with collecting evidence of the
crimes visited on N.M., the DYFS worker was responsible for en143
suring N.M.’s continued safety and well-being.

Thus, the majority determined that Nurudeen’s role at the hospital
was to resolve a “life-threatening emergency” and was not to aid in
144
the investigation of Buda’s prosecution.
Based on this rationale,

government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Thus, it would be difficult to argue that N.M.’s statement to Christine could be “testimonial.” In fact, almost no post-Crawford cases have found that statements made to family or friends are
“testimonial.” See Mosteller, supra note 23, at 947–48.
138
Buda, 949 A.2d at 778.
139
See supra Part II.D.
140
Buda, 949 A.2d at 778–79.
141
Id. at 778.
142
Id. at 780.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 778; see infra note 171 (discussing the majority’s decision to use the term
“life-threatening emergency”).
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the court concluded that N.M.’s statements were “nontestimonial”
145
and reinstated Buda’s conviction.
IV. THE BUDA MAJORITY’S FLAWED APPROACH AND REASONING
While the majority was ultimately correct in concluding that
146
N.M.’s statements were not “testimonial,” the three dissenting justices properly criticized the majority’s reasoning. The majority stated
that Nurudeen was gathering facts for a purely civil purpose—
protecting N.M. from a “life-threatening emergency”—and not for
147
any prosecutorial purpose. This conclusion is problematic because
it attempts to make a parallel comparison between Buda and Davis
but is only able to do so by distorting the meaning of an “ongoing
emergency” and by denying the crucial role that DYFS workers play in
investigating and prosecuting child abusers.
A. The Buda Majority’s Reliance on Davis Was Misplaced
The first major problem with the Buda majority opinion is that it
relies too heavily on the factually distinct Davis case. While Davis did
provide some criteria for explaining the meaning of “testimonial,”
the decision also left much unresolved. It seems as though the rule
laid down in Davis was tailored specifically to fit facts before the
Court, as opposed to a general “one size fits all” rule that was predetermined and subsequently applied to the facts of the cases before
the Court. As the dissenting justices in Buda point out, “the test set
forth in Davis ‘suffice[d] to decide’ [Hammon and Davis.] The [United States Supreme] Court was prescient to foresee that a multitude of
variations on the theme would arise and did not expect a court, such
as [the New Jersey Supreme Court], to apply its words mechanistical148
ly . . . .”

145

Buda, 949 A.2d at 780.
See infra Part V.C for a more detailed explanation of why N.M.’s statement was
not “testimonial.”
147
Buda, 949 A.2d at 778.
148
Id. at 786. Significantly, Judge Sabatino of the appellate division seemed to be
begging for another way to decide the case when he wrote, “[I]f one is compelled to
identify a single dominant purpose of Nurudeen’s hospital interview of N.M. here, I
am inclined to agree with my colleagues that the interview was mainly to assist law
enforcement . . . . Forced to choose, I concur with the majority’s assessment that the
child’s statement to Nurudeen was ‘testimonial’ . . . .” State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735,
749 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (Sabatino, J., concurring) (emphasis added),
rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008). One of this Comment’s main points is that a court
146
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With that critique in mind, it is helpful to think of Davis and
Hammon as setting forth two polar ends on a continuum of possible
Confrontation Clause scenarios, with one end representing clearly
“testimonial” statements (Hammon) and the other end representing
statements that are “nontestimonial” (Davis). The holdings in those
149
cases were relatively uncontroversial and unsurprising because in
both cases the declarants were competent adults, the statements were
responses to questions from law-enforcement personnel, the primary
150
purpose of the questions could be (arguably) fairly easily identified,
and the line at which each respective emergency ended was fairly
straightforward. But Davis does not give any detailed directive on
how to decide cases that fall in the middle of the continuum, such as
the Buda case, where the declarant is a young child, the questioner is
not a law-enforcement employee, and the interview has an unverifia151
ble or dual purpose.
As opposed to interpreting Davis as establishing the polar ends
of a continuum, the Buda majority seems to have interpreted Davis as
setting forth two discrete possibilities, forcing them to pigeonhole
Nurudeen into either the role of a 911 operator responding to a
crime in progress or into that of a police officer asking questions
about a crime committed in the past to gather evidence. The Buda
case, however, did not fall into either one of those scenarios. Therefore, any attempt at a literal application of Davis could not sufficiently

should not be “forced” or “compelled” to apply a doctrine to a set of facts to which it
does not apply and that will not sufficiently resolve the legal issue at hand.
149
In fact, one commentator argued that the rule laid down in Davis can be explained by the common law res gestae doctrine, the predecessor of the modern excited-utterance exception. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What is Happening—to the Confrontation Clause?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587, 608–16 (2007). Professor Fisher
compares the modern day 911 call to the “hue and cry” of crime victims during the
framing era—calls that had the purpose of both alerting the village constable to the
commission of a crime and aiding in the perpetrator’s criminal prosecution. Id. at
592. Noting the lack of reliable records from criminal trials in the framing era, Fisher examined criminal cases in the post-framing era and found that courts would admit victims’ statements that were made contemporaneously with the criminal act but
not those that described past events. Id. at 598–99. According to Fisher’s study, res
gestae statements were exempt from the common-law right of confrontation and
this, he argues, fully explains the Court’s rationale in Davis. Id. at 603, 608.
150
But see supra note 77.
151
See State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 748 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (Sabatino,
J., concurring) (noting that Davis does not “contemplate the sticky circumstance in
which the ‘primary purpose’ of a declarant’s interview is unclear, or where the interview is being conducted for dual or multiple purposes”), rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J.
2008).
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resolve the legal issue before the court. The Buda court appears to
have overemphasized the utility of the Davis opinion and applied it in
152
a mechanistic manner that was unintended by the Supreme Court.
B. Denying the Investigatory Purpose of DYFS Investigators
Despite the assertions of the Buda majority, DYFS investigators
regularly play a substantial role in the criminal prosecution of ac153
cused child abusers, and the facts of the case demonstrate that Nurudeen had a substantial prosecutorial purpose when she questioned
N.M. DYFS has the legal responsibility of investigating allegations of
154
child abuse and then, based on a set of prescribed factors, making
152

Although the author disagrees that the Davis opinion was a directive to lower
courts to look only at the alleged purpose of a questioner, some courts believe that
that was exactly what the Court was implying. See, e.g., State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d
916, 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). (“It has become evident under Crawford and Davis
that the Supreme Court has deliberately abandoned a prior, vague Confrontation
Clause test in favor of a new approach that focuses on an uncomplicated study of the
purpose of an interviewer who takes a statement that is later introduced as trial evidence.”). This position is questionable because the Supreme Court has indicated
that “testimonial” statements can be made even when no questioner is involved. See
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1. It is perplexing to consider how courts using an “uncomplicated study of the purpose of the interviewer” would address situations such as
taped crime tips, accusatory written documents, and any other situation in which information is given without an interviewer.
153
The majority recognized this fact when it stated,
This is not to say that a DYFS worker in all instances will be acting in
a purely civil capacity. One can envision circumstances where the
DYFS worker serves predominantly as an agent / proxy or an operative
for law enforcement in the collection of evidence of past crimes . . .
that may well render the hearsay statements thereby procured testimonial under Crawford. However, other than acknowledging that possibility, we need not discuss it further in this case in light of the facts
presented.
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 779–80 (N.J. 2008) (citation omitted). In light of the
court’s holding, however, it is hard to conceive of a set of facts that would lend to a
finding of a “testimonial” statement made to a DYFS worker.
154
See Public Hearing Before Senate Committee on Children’s Services Committee: To Examine Policy Issues Relating to Investigations by the Division of Youth and Family Services of
Reports of Child Abuse, 1988 Leg., 203rd Sess. 26, 45–46 (N.J. 1988) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing] (statement of William Waldman, Director, DYFS). During that initial investigation, DYFS workers are required to
interview the alleged child victim . . . [,]
....
[i]nterview . . . the caregiver and each adult in the home . . . [,]
....
[i]nterview . . . each other person identified . . . as having knowledge of
the incident or as having made an assessment of physical harm . . . [,
and]
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the decision about whether to report the case to the county prosecu155
tor.
If a case is referred to the prosecutor, the DYFS investigator
must include a written report, the contents of which have information that can be used as evidence against the abuser in a criminal tri156
al.
After referring a case to a prosecutor, DYFS conducts “factfinding” investigations, which involve in-depth interviews with victims,
157
alleged perpetrators, and others to determine “what happened,” not
simply what is happening. This investigation may be going on simultaneously with the prosecutor’s investigation, and the two investigations
158
Thus, as the Buda dissent points out, the
“may merge” into one.
[i]nterview . . . the alleged perpetrator
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-2.5 (2009). Further, “the child protective investigator
shall determine if a joint investigation is possible and consult with the investigating
police officer or prosecutor before interviewing the alleged child victim, unless
emergency action is needed.” Id.
155
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-3.1.
156
Id. § 10:129-5.5(e) (“The written information regarding the report shall include: 1. The name and age of each child victim and his or her address; 2. The name
and age of each of the child victim’s siblings, if any, obtained by the child protective
investigator during his or her investigation; 3. The name of each perpetrator, his or
her address, and his or her relationship to each child victim . . . .”).
157
Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 26 (statement of William Waldman, Director,
DYFS) (emphasis added).
158
See Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 56 (Statement of Joyce Munkacsi, Assistant
Prosecutor, Middlesex County and Co-chair, Governor’s Task Force on Child Abuse
and Neglect). Not only might these investigations “merge,” but DYFS’s regulatory
scheme apparently encourages their investigators to work directly with the police and
prosecutors. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:129-1.1(b) (2009). The purpose of this regulation is to
Define each circumstance requiring [DYFS’s] referral of a report to a
medical or other professional, law enforcement officer or prosecutor
for specialized assessment;
. . . [s]et forth guidelines by which Division caseworkers may easily
identify cases that must be referred to prosecutors;
. . . [e]stablish procedures for such referrals to prosecutors;
. . . [e]stablish a system through which a Department caseworker may
assist prosecutors in determining which cases should be investigated
for criminal prosecution and in identifying cases in which criminal investigation or prosecution would be detrimental to the child’s best interests;
. . . [e]stablish a framework for liaison and improved communication
and cooperation between the Department’s local offices and the prosecutors’ offices in order to further the mutual goals of protecting the
child and proper law enforcement; [and]
. . . identify the requirements for accessing law enforcement assistance[.]
Id.
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“protection of the child and prosecution of the offender [are] inex159
tricably intertwined.”
The merging of the investigations occurs because the same facts
are relevant to both family-law proceedings involving child abuse and
the criminal prosecution of a defendant for that abuse, with the only
major evidentiary distinction being the standard of proof required
160
for judicial action.
Thus, facts found by police officers may frequently be used in civil proceedings because parental abuse is
161
grounds for termination of custody and because the fact-finding investigations led by DYFS are the basis for deciding whether to prose162
cute an alleged abuser.
The foregoing should be well known by the New Jersey judiciary.
163
For example, in State v. Helewa the appellate division held that the
164
Miranda doctrine applied to a DYFS worker who had conducted a
custodial interview of a criminal defendant accused of child abuse.
There, the court held that the DYFS worker was acting as an agent of
165
law enforcement. The court reasoned that
there is significant cooperation with DYFS during the investigatory stages of child abuse cases, specifically with respect to the exchange of reports and other sources of information. . . . Although the DYFS caseworker’s ultimate purpose in obtaining
information from the alleged perpetrator is to ensure the protection and welfare of the child, the likelihood of such information
being used against the perpetrator in a criminal prosecution
changes the status of the “social worker” to one of a “law en166
forcement officer” . . . .

159

State v. Buda, 949 A.2d at 761, 786 (N.J. 2008) (Albin, J., dissenting).
See Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 40 (statement of William Waldman, Director, DYFS) (“There are individuals that may have been found not guilty in criminal
court proceeding, but where abuses and/or neglect may have been substantiated by
both [DYFS] and the family court of New Jersey.”).
161
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN § 30:4C-15(a) (West 2008) (establishing that a conviction for child abuse permits the filing of a petition for termination of parental
rights).
162
See Senate Hearing, supra note 154, at 40–41 (statement of William Waldman,
Director, DYFS).
163
537 A.2d 1328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
164
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
165
Helewa, 537 A.2d at 1333.
166
Id. at 1332.
160
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It bears repeating that on the night that Nurudeen interviewed N.M.,
167
Hess and the police were already at the hospital when she arrived.
Nurudeen and Hess met before she interviewed N.M. and discussed
168
how the two of them should proceed in interviewing N.M. Because
169
Hess was interviewing Buda, he asked Nurudeen to speak with N.M.
To borrow terminology from criminal law, it seems evident that Nurudeen’s state of mind when she questioned N.M. was that she knowingly, if not intentionally, questioned N.M. to give information to
Hess that would aid in a criminal prosecution. With this in mind, the
Buda majority apparently indulged in a legal fiction when it asserted
that Nurudeen was investigating in a purely civil capacity.
C. The Court Distorted the Meaning of an Ongoing Emergency
In addition to denying that Nurudeen had a prosecutorial purpose, the court used flawed reasoning when it asserted that N.M. was
facing a “life-threatening emergency” analogous to the situation in
170
Davis. The Buda court’s choice of words makes clear that it was analogizing N.M.’s situation to what the Supreme Court called an “ongoing emergency” in Davis, which the Court explained is an indicator of
171
a “nontestimonial” statement. This analogy, however, is misplaced
because Davis makes perfectly clear that “ongoing emergenc[ies]” are
172
short lived and are contingent on the threat of imminent danger.
Using the Buda majority’s reasoning, N.M.’s life had been one
continuous “ongoing emergency” from the time that he and Chris-

167

State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2008).
Id. at 781 (Albin, J., dissenting).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 778 (majority opinion).
171
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). While the Buda majority
used the term “life-threatening emergency” as opposed to “ongoing emergency,” it is
readily apparent that the two terms were meant to be synonymous for all practical
purposes. The Buda dissent only refers to “ongoing emergencies,” Buda, 949 A.2d at
784–85 (Albin, J., dissenting), and part of the reason why the appellate division held
that N.M.’s statements were “testimonial” was that N.M. was no longer facing an ongoing emergency in need of immediate resolution. State v. Buda, 912 A.2d 735, 745
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), rev’d, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008). In fact, nowhere in
Crawford or Davis does the Court even mention a “life-threatening” emergency—a
fact that casts some doubt on the Buda majority’s choice of words and the import
given to them. For purposes of argument in this Comment, however, “lifethreatening” and “ongoing” will be treated synonymously.
172
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (emphasis added). The Court noted that Davis’s 911 call
could easily turn into a “testimonial” statement once the emergency clearly ended.
Id.
168
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tine moved in with Buda—an idea that is antithetical to the explanation given in Davis. The majority’s reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny because any imminent threat of physical harm had ended hours
before Nurudeen began questioning N.M. During the questioning,
N.M. was in a hospital, protected by his grandparents, a prosecutor,
and police officers; he was physically separated from his mother and
Buda; and the last incident of abuse had occurred at least several
173
hours before Nurudeen arrived. Despite the majority’s reliance on
Davis, N.M.’s situation was not comparable to the ongoing emergency
present in that case—a woman who was being or had just been physi174
cally assaulted.
Davis also explains that “ongoing emergencies” can be identified
175
by the time reference of the dialogue. Specifically, questions aimed
at resolving ongoing emergencies will elicit answers about events “as
176
177
they [are] happening,” not “‘describing past events.’”
Nurudeen’s
178
questions, “‘Did anybody hit you?’” and “‘Did anybody beat you?’”
were clearly aimed at discovering facts about past events. While it is
indisputable that returning N.M. to Buda and Christine could have
been detrimental to his mental and physical health, believing that
N.M. was facing an ongoing emergency in the hospital that night is
more than a stretch. A deplorable situation—even one that can be
described as life threatening—is not the equivalent of an ongoing
emergency if the immediacy of the physical harm is absent.
V. THE MISSING LINK: N.M.’S COMPETENCY TO MAKE
A TESTIMONIAL STATEMENT
While the reasoning behind the majority’s decision is problematic, its conclusion that N.M.’s statements to Nurudeen were not “testimonial” is ultimately correct—but for reasons other than those given. Under Crawford, extrajudicial declarants who make “testimonial”
statements are analogues to in-court witnesses, at least for Confronta179
tion Clause purposes. Just as some children are not competent to
173
Buda, 949 A.2d at 785 (Albin, J., dissenting). The Buda dissenters actually considered N.M.’s situation to be much more analogous to the facts of the Hammon case
as opposed to those of Davis. Id.
174
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
175
Id. at 827.
176
Id.
177
Id. (citation omitted).
178
Buda, 949 A.2d at 782 (Albin, J., dissenting).
179
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
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be witnesses at trial, some children likewise may not be competent to
act as witnesses in an extrajudicial setting, rendering them incapable
180
of making “testimonial” statements.
In the Buda case, N.M. likely
did not possess this “testimonial” competence, and therefore, confrontation was not constitutionally required—not because Nurudeen
was acting in a purely civil capacity in an attempt to end an ongoing
emergency but, rather, because N.M. was not competent to act as a
“witness” against Buda. Although the Supreme Court of the United
States has yet to explicitly recognize or define what “testimonial”
competence is and how it can be determined, clues about “testimonial” competence can be taken from the requirements of formal trial
competency, from the Court’s description of “testimonial” statements
in Crawford and Davis, and also from the Court’s Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination jurisprudence.
A. Trial Witnesses
The Davis Court explained that “testimonial” statements are
“substitute[s] for live testimony because they do precisely what a wit181
ness does on direct examination.”
Given the parallel between incourt and extrajudicial witnesses, it is relevant for this Comment’s
purposes to consider the competency requirements of potential trial
witnesses.
In the American legal system, a witness must be competent to
182
testify.
A competent witness is one who has personal knowledge
about the issue for which he will testify and can and will take an oath
183
or affirmation that his testimony will be truthful. While an oath or
affirmation is explicitly a witness’s promise to tell the truth, implicit
in the taking of the oath is the witness’s assurance to the court that he
understands his moral duty to be honest and that lying has adverse
184
consequences. The oath was originally intended to impress on the

180

See supra note 26.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
182
See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 160 (2004).
183
See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6002 (2d ed. 2007); see also FED. R. EVID. 603; N.J.R.E. 603. Although the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not define oath or affirmation, the general difference
between the two is that an oath is a solemn promise to God to speak the truth, while
an affirmation is a promise to tell the truth without any religious invocation. See 27
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra § 6044.
184
See FED. R. EVID. 603 (stating that the oath is “calculated to awaken the witness’
conscience and impress the witness’ mind with the duty” to tell the truth); see also
181
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185

witness fear of divine punishment for lying. Although belief in di186
vine retribution is no longer a prerequisite for testifying, witnesses
who intentionally lie—perjurers—may still be subject to criminal pu187
nishment. These burdens are placed on the witness, at least in part
due to the serious consequences that the accused in a criminal trial
188
could face as a result of the witness’s testimony.
Courts have long struggled with the issue of child-witness compe189
At early common law, very young children, usually those
tency.
younger than seven, were presumed incompetent because they were
190
believed to be unable to fully understand and appreciate the oath.
The writings of the seventeenth century English jurist, Sir Matthew
Hale, however, indicate that many courts took the position that incompetent children’s hearsay should be admitted in cases of sexual
abuse because it was the best evidence available and also that incom191
petent children ought to be able to speak to the jury unsworn. In
the late 1700s, the presumption of incompetence was effectively elim192
inated after King v. Brasier, a case in which the Twelve Judges held

State v. Zamorsky, 387 A.2d 1227, 1230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). The Zamorsky court stated,
Since the goal is to ascertain the child’s comprehension of the duty of
a witness to tell the truth, it is first necessary to explore the child’s conceptual awareness of truth and falsehood. The younger the child, the
more searching the inquiry must be. When it has been established that
the child understands the meaning of those terms, the next area of inquiry is not, as is so often the case, whether the child will tell the truth,
but rather whether the child understands that it is his or her duty to tell the
truth. This is the essence of moral responsibility.
Id. at 1230 (emphasis added).
185
See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 183, § 6044.
186
See In re R.R., 398 A.2d 76, 82 (N.J. 1979).
187
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:28-1 (West 2005).
188
See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 525–26 (1895) (“[C]are must
be taken by the trial judge [in assessing competency], especially where, as in this
case, the question is one of life or death.”). A noteworthy law in New York allows incompetent children to make unsworn statements to the jury but does not permit the
defendant to be convicted based solely on these unsworn statements. N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 60.20 (Consol. 1996).
189
See The Competency of Child Witnesses, 39 VA. L. REV. 358, 358 (1953).
190
See John E. B. Meyers, The Testimonial Competence of Children, 25 J. FAM. L. 287,
293 n.29 (1986–1987) (citing 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 188
(3d ed. 1944)).
191
See Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children’s Hearsay:
From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1034–35 (2007).
192
R v. Brasier, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.), reprinted in Lyon & Lamagna, supra note 191, at 1032–33.
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that courts should no longer presume incompetence based solely
193
upon a child’s age. Thus, after Brasier, unless a court found a specific child to be incompetent after examination, the child would be
194
required to testify under oath.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and New Jersey Rules of Evidence
take the view that all witnesses, regardless of age, are presumed to be
195
formally competent.
If a party raises a substantial question about
the child’s competence, however, the court may conduct an examina196
tion and make a discretionary ruling.
When a court determines
193

Id.
See Lyon & Lamagna, supra note 191, at 1052. The Twelve Judges were a group
of judges from the three common law courts who would hear significant legal issues
and whose decisions set binding precedent. Id. at 1032 n.10 (citing JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 212–13 (2003)). Brasier
appears to have been cited by the Davis court to support the notion that “ongoing
emergencies” are short lived. Id. at 1030. In Brasier, a young girl complained to her
mother that she had just been raped. Id. at 1032–33 (citing R v. Brasier, (1779) 168
Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.)). The trial court presumed the child to be incompetent and
allowed her mother to testify about the child’s complaint. Id. The Twelve Judges
ruled that the trial court had erred in presuming the child to be incompetent and
that henceforth courts should use discretion when faced with a question of an individual child’s competency to take the oath. Id. at 1032–33. Thus, Brasier eliminated
the presumption of incompetence, but it also stands for the proposition that children’s hearsay should still be admitted if it is the best evidence available—that is, when
the child is incapable of testifying under oath. Id. at 1053. Notably, one suggestion
is that Brasier should be interpreted as a prohibition on children’s hearsay, which
comes from WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (Richard Burn ed., 9th ed. 1783).
Lyon & Lamagna, supra note 191, at 1053. But Burn only briefly mentions Brasier,
and his sources are unknown. Id. Furthermore, many case reports and treatises after
Brasier indicate that incompetent children’s hearsay was still regularly admitted,
which shows that Brasier did not affect this practice. Id. at 1052–53.
195
FED. R. EVID. 601; N.J.R.E. 601. Jurisdictions, like New Jersey, that follow the
approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence do not need to take any special precautions for child witnesses. See LUCY S. MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 106 (1994). Children as young as three have been
deemed competent to give testimony at trial. See State v. R.W., 514 A.2d 1287 (N.J.
1986). In addition, a national trend has been to lower formal competency standards
and, in some cases, eliminate competency inquiries altogether. See MCGOUGH, supra,
at 14, 106–07. While the author agrees that age is not a determinative factor of competence, courts should be wary of allowing very young children to testify because
formal competence serves the purpose of promoting honest and reliable testimony.
The diminution of competency standards runs the risk of reducing the competence
requirement to a meaningless formalism that not only is prejudicial to the defendant
but also is not the best route to ensuring that children’s accounts of abuse are admitted into evidence.
196
See, e.g., Galindo v. United States, 630 A.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting
the need to conduct competency tests on very young children); see also Walters v.
McCormick, 108 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 1997) (“After a defendant raises a colorable objection to the competency of a witness, the trial judge must perform a ‘reason194
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that a child is competent to testify, the court is not guaranteeing that
the child will be truthful but, rather, is deciding that the child at least
has the ability to appreciate the oath and the responsibilities it en197
Without this understanding, the child may be deemed intails.
198
competent to testify and disqualified as a witness.
Thus, one aspect of “testimonial” competence can be extracted
from formal competency standards: the competency requirements of
trial witnesses lead to the logical assumption that a child who would
be incompetent to testify at trial could not possibly make a “testi199
monial” statement before trial.
A finding that a child-victim is incompetent to testify at trial would be difficult to reconcile with a ruling that the child was competent to be a witness against the accused
at the time that he made the statement before trial. Therefore, under Crawford, the formally incompetent child could not have made a
“testimonial” statement, and confrontation is not required by the
Constitution. To assert otherwise would be the equivalent of a court
saying, “It is not possible for this child to be a witness at trial because
he is not competent to testify. He is too young to comprehend the
difference between truth and falsehood nor does he understand the
moral duties and obligations required of a witness. But because the
child was acting as a witness and giving the equivalent of testimony

able exploration of all the facts and circumstances’ concerning competency.” (quoting Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1523 (11th Cir. 1987))). Because FED. R.
EVID. 601 does not explicitly state that federal courts have authority to disqualify a
witness based on competency, the federal courts of appeals have taken two primary
approaches to the issue. See RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND
CASES 169 (2006). Some courts, like the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
have held that the authority to disqualify a witness does not come from FED. R. EVID.
601 but rather from rules covering the prejudicial effect of the proffered testimony
(FED. R. EVID. 403), the ability of the potential witness to comprehend the oath (FED.
R. EVID. 603), and whether the witness can satisfy the personal-knowledge requirement (FED. R. EVID. 602). See ALLEN ET AL, supra, at 169 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1989)). Others, like the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, have taken the approach that courts retain the discretionary power
they had at common law, which is presently derived from Rule 601. See id. at 170 (citing United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 291–92 (1st Cir. 1990)).
197
N.J.R.E. 601 advisory committee’s note.
198
See, e.g., State v. D.R., 537 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1987) (where the trial court ruled that
the three-year-old did not understand the duty to tell the truth, thus making her incompetent to testify).
199
At least one court has considered this argument. See State v. Krasky, 736
N.W.2d 636, 642 n.6 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “it would be an odd outcome if we
were to hold that, while [the child] is not competent to be called to the stand to give
testimony in court, her out-of-court statements . . . are nonetheless inadmissible because they are testimonial in nature”).
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before trial, his statements cannot be admitted unless he confronts
the defendant and gives live testimony in court.” Based on the logical
absurdity of that scenario, it seems fair to infer that, at a minimum, a
child who is incompetent to testify at trial was not “testimonially”
competent before trial.
B. What a “Testimonial” Statement Requires of the Declarant

200

The U.S. Supreme Court has never explicitly defined the term
“testimonial” nor has it set firm guidelines for identifying a “testi201
monial” statement in all situations.
The Crawford and Davis opinions, however, suggest several questions and criteria that courts
should consider when determining the “testimonial” nature of a
statement, including (1) Was the information given/taken in a for202
mal manner?; (2) Were the declarant’s statements solemn affirma203
204
tions?; (3) Was the declarant doing what a trial witness does?; (4)
Did the statement contain the “common nucleus” of “testimonial”
205
statements?; and (5) Was the primary purpose of any questioning to
gather past facts that would be potentially relevant to a criminal pros206
ecution?
Affirmative answers to any of these questions militate toward finding that the statement was “testimonial.”
1.

The Common Nucleus of “Testimonial” Statements

In Crawford, the Supreme Court considered adopting the following definitions of “testimonial”:
[(1)] ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
200

This Part of the Comment is meant only to be a brief summary of the author’s
interpretation of the meaning of “testimonial” to support a later argument regarding
the competency required to make such a statement. As might be clear by now, however, the meaning of “testimonial” is somewhat vague and is subject to several interpretations. For a more in depth treatment of the meaning of “testimonial” see Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553 (2007).
201
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004) (refusing to accept any
of three proffered definitions of “testimonial”); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
813, 822 (2006) (giving guidance about “testimonial” statements only in response to
police interrogations).
202
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 n.5 (“We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential
to testimonial utterance.”).
203
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
204
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
205
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
206
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 830.
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pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially; . . . [or (2)] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to be207
lieve that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.

While it declined to adopt either definition, the Court stated
that “[t]hese formulations all share a common nucleus and then de208
fine the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”
Considering these two formulations and what they share in common,
the common nucleus must relate to the speaker’s expectation that his
209
statement could be used in a prosecutorial fashion.
2.

The Solemnity Requirement

In Crawford, the Court also stated that testimony and, thus, a
“testimonial” statement, is a “‘solemn declaration or affirmation
210
The
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”
Court has given examples of what it considers to be solemn declarations, such as when “[a]n accuser . . . makes a formal statement to
211
212
government officers” or the police. The Court has also indicated
that a solemn declaration is not given when “a person . . . makes a ca213
sual remark to an acquaintance.” Nor does a person give a solemn
declaration when he “unwittingly” makes a statement to a government informant, notwithstanding the fact that the informant was gathering incriminating information to assist the police in a criminal
214
prosecution.
207

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The Crawford Court also considered Justice Thomas’s definition of
“testimonial” that he put forth in his concurring opinion in White v. Illinois: “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)). This definition was later rejected by
the Davis Court as being too narrow in scope and unfaithful to the Framers’ intent.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
208
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
209
See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 925 (Colo. 2006) (noting that “the ‘common
nucleus’ . . . centers upon the declarant’s reasonable expectations”).
210
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citation omitted).
211
Id.
212
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826. See also State ex rel J.A., 949 A.2d 790, 804 (N.J.
2008), where the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a statement to a police officer was a solemn declaration because there criminal penalties attached to making a
knowingly false statement and, therefore, were considered “testimonial.”
213
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
214
Davis, 547 U.S. at 825 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181–84
(1987)).
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A review of those examples demonstrates that even if a statement
is incriminating, which is possible whether a person makes a remark
to a government officer, an acquaintance, or an informant, it is only
considered a “solemn declaration” in the cases where the declarant
should reasonably know that the recipient of the information holds a
law-enforcement or other governmental position. Also present in the
examples of solemn declarations is the declarant’s reasonable expectation that legal consequences could attach to his statements, both
215
for himself and for others about whom he may be speaking. Absent
from the situations that are not considered solemn declarations is the
declarant’s reasonable anticipation that any official consequences
would result from his statements.
3.

The Formality Requirement

The formality of the circumstances under which a statement is
made is also relevant to whether a statement is “testimonial” in na216
ture because it serves as an indicator to the declarant that a substantial likelihood exists that his statement will be used prosecutorially.
As the Court explained in Davis, the formality of an interrogation
makes it “more objectively apparent” that the interrogation was de217
signed to elicit facts about past criminal events. Part of the reason
why the statements were considered “testimonial” in Hammon but not
in Davis is due to the presence of formality in the former “interroga218
tion” and its absence in the latter. The formality requirement suggests that the “testimonial” nature of a statement depends largely on
whether circumstances would reasonably lead the speaker to expect
that his statements might be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.
4.

What a Witness Does

According to the Davis court, those who make “testimonial”
219
statements do exactly what a trial witness does.
Trial witnesses an-

215
For example, an affidavit can be used as evidence in some situations, see 3 AM.
JUR. 2D Affidavits § 19 (2002), and making a false statement in one can subject the
declarant to penalties. See 60A AM. JUR. 2D Perjury § 40 (2003).
216
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (“We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to
testimonial utterance.”).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 827, 830. But see generally Ross, supra note 21.
219
Davis, 547 U.S. at 830.
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220

swer questions that are designed to elicit evidence.
The Supreme
Court explained that “[n]o ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an
221
emergency and seek help.”
Framed in this way, it seems that the
declarant’s purpose in making the statement is relevant and that
extrajudicial declarants only make “testimonial” statements when the
impetus behind the statement was to provide evidence of another’s
guilt.
5.

The Purpose of the “Interrogation”

The Davis court explained that “when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
222
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution,” the answers to those questions are “testimonial.” The Court, however, followed that explanation with a footnote stating that “it is in the final
analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions
223
that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”
Although
some courts have interpreted these lines to mean that the only varia224
ble in the “testimonial” equation is the questioner’s purpose, a
more plausible reading is that the questioner’s purpose is relevant
only to the extent that it would lead the declarant to expect his
225
statements to be used prosecutorially. Thus, this criterion also hints
that the declarant’s expectations, based on the circumstances surrounding the statement, are the determinative factor in the “testimonial” equation.
C. The Court’s Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence
Notably, Crawford and its progeny share much in common with
the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, which supports the notion that the “testimonial” nature of a statement hinges on the decla220

See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 1 (2002).
Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
222
Id. at 822.
223
Id. at 822 n.1.
224
See supra note 152; see also United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th
Cir. 2005); State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2006); State v. Mack, 101
P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004).
225
See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Ohio 2006) (“In determining
whether a statement is testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, courts should
focus on the expectation of the declarant at the time of making the statement; the
intent of a questioner is relevant only if it could affect a reasonable declarant’s expectations.”).
221
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rant’s reasonable anticipation that it could be used in a subsequent
criminal trial. For example, the Court has held that a violation of the
226
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination can be successfully invoked by a criminal suspect only when his pretrial statements are
compelled, incriminating, and testimonial (not in the Crawford
227
If a compelled statement is testimonial (communicative),
sense).
but the suspect does not “reasonably believe[]” that his statements
can be used against him as evidence in a criminal trial, no Fifth
228
Amendment violation occurs.
Thus, to determine whether a Fifth
Amendment violation has occurred, the Court has focused on whether the suspect (or the “witness against himself”) had a reasonable belief that his statements would be used as evidence in a subsequent
criminal trial against him.
In addition, the Court’s use of the word “interrogation” in Davis
229
may be borrowed from a line of Fifth Amendment Miranda cases in
which the Court has held that a criminal suspect’s incriminating
statements are only subject to a Miranda analysis if he has been sub230
ject to an “interrogation.” Significantly, for Fifth Amendment purposes an interrogation
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of police . . . that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the per231
ceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.

Clearly, the perceptions of the suspect are not decisive factors in a
Miranda analysis. The Court has held that even when a suspect makes
incriminating statements to an agent of law enforcement, no violation occurs if the suspect is unaware that he is being surreptitiously
232
“interrogated” and providing incriminating information.
226
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
227
See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S.
177, 189–90 (2004). Testimonial in these cases refers to communicative assertions.
See supra note 17.
228
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445
(1972)).
229
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
230
See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981).
231
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
232
See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) (“Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda.”).
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The Court has also held that an exception to a Miranda violation
exists that is similar to the Davis ongoing emergency rule. Even if a
suspect, while being interrogated, has a reasonable belief that his
statements will be used as evidence against him, no Miranda violation
occurs when “police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a
233
concern for the public safety.” The Court, however, was careful to
note that “most police officers [in an emergency situation] would act
out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives—their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the
desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect”—but their
individual motivations are irrelevant to the Fifth Amendment analy234
sis. Thus, if the Court is using its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
as a guide for its Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis,
then a statement clearly is only “testimonial” when it is reasonable to
conclude that the declarant should know, based on the context of the
situation, that his statements could be used in a criminal prosecu235
tion, unless the statements are given in response to an emergency
situation that requires immediate resolution for safety reasons.
D. N.M. Was Not Constitutionally Required to Confront Buda
1.

N.M. Was Not “Testimonially” Competent

The foregoing criteria suggest that three prerequisites exist for
making a “testimonial” statement in the context of a question and an236
swer dialogue.
First, a questioner who has actual law-enforcement
capacity or who can be considered an arm of law enforcement must
237
Second, the questioner must ask his questions in a
be involved.

233

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
Id.
235
The major difference between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment analyses is that
under the Fifth Amendment, it is the suspect who must be aware that he is incriminating himself, while under the Sixth Amendment, the declarant must be aware that
his statements could be incriminating as to a third party.
236
This Comment deals only with situations in which a questioner is involved because that was the context of the Buda, Davis / Hammon, and Crawford statements;
however, a “testimonial” statement can be made in other circumstances. See Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006).
237
Many courts have found that statements made to private individuals, such as
parents, friends, and doctors are not considered testimonial. See, e.g., People v. Cage,
155 P.3d 205, 219 (Cal. 2007) (child’s statement to emergency-room doctor); People
v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920–21, 928 (Colo. 2006) (child’s statement to his father); In re
Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (child’s statement to his moth234
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238

(somewhat) formal manner.
And finally, the speaker should be
able to use the context of the situation to recognize that his answers
239
could be used in a prosecutorial manner.
The speaker’s ability to digest the context of the situation is the
heart of “testimonial” competence. The value of the contextual criteria mentioned by the Court—such as the formality and solemnity of
the exchange, the questioner’s law-enforcement role, and the absence of an ongoing emergency—hinges on the declarant’s recognition and use of them. Those criteria lose their value if a declarant
could not process them. Thus, N.M., who in all likelihood would not
be able to appreciate the “testimonial” circumstances of his dialogue
with Nurudeen, did not make a “testimonial” statement because there
is very little chance that he was doing “what a witness does”—
knowingly providing potential evidence.
If a “testimonially” competent person was in N.M.’s place, the
statements undoubtedly would be considered “testimonial.” Nurudeen was acting as an agent of the prosecutor, her questioning was
just as, if not more, formal than the questioning in Hammon, and
240
N.M. was in no immediate danger. Nevertheless, the crucial point
is that N.M. was unable to identify Nurudeen’s law-enforcement purpose, and thus, his words could not be considered “solemn declarations” or testimony. Although Nurudeen’s questioning might be considered “formal,” the formality requirement presupposes that the
declarant has the capacity to understand that formal questioning indicates that the questioner may be attempting to elicit and preserve
evidence. That is, the formality requirement hinges on the speaker’s
ability to recognize a prosecutorial purpose when he sees one.

er); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (adult’s statement to
doctor); see also Mosteller, supra note 23, at 944–48, 950–57.
238
For a critique of the way the Court applied this factor in the Davis and Hammon
cases, see Ross, supra note 21, at 186–89 (arguing that the questioning in Hammon
was less formal than that of Davis).
239
The idea that whether a statement is “testimonial” hinges on the declarant’s
anticipation of the statement’s prosecutorial use was advocated by Richard D. Friedman in a pre-Crawford article, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay.
See Friedman, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 247 (explaining that a “testimonial”
statement is one in which “an out-of-court declarant knows that she is probably providing evidence toward investigation or prosecution of a crime”). Courts that follow
this analysis have also been split over whether to use the perspective of an “objective
adult” or an “objective child of the same knowledge and understanding.” See Mosteller, supra note 23, at 976–84.
240
See supra Part IV.B–C.
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While it would be futile to engage in a hypothetical guessing
game about N.M.’s subjective state of mind when he answered Nurudeen’s questions, the circumstantial evidence militates toward finding
an extremely low probability that he had any idea that his statements
could or might be used against Buda in a criminal trial: N.M. was
241
three years old when he made the statement; no evidence indicates
that he had any previous contact with the criminal-justice system or
242
DYFS; he had just been examined by medical professionals who
243
were concerned with his injuries; and given the events of the day, it
is likely that he was mentally and emotionally exhausted. Given those
factors, it would be illogical to conclude that N.M. had the capacity to
recognize the possibility that his words could or might be used
against his mother’s boyfriend in a future criminal prosecution.
Therefore, he was not acting as a witness under Crawford and was not
244
constitutionally required to confront Buda.
2.

There Would Be No Value in Requiring Confrontation
Between N.M. and Buda

Besides N.M.’s competence, in light of the courage-gathering na245
ture that the Crawford court has assigned to confrontation, requiring N.M. to face Buda in court would have apparently been fruitless.
N.M.’s situation does not resemble any of the models of required

241

State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 765 (N.J. 2008).
Nothing in the opinion suggests that Christine or N.M. had ever previously
dealt with DYFS.
243
Buda, 949 A.2d at 766.
244
Many courts argue that taking an approach similar to the one advocated in this
Comment could lead to prosecutorial abuse and that interviewers of children could
flout the Confrontation Clause by asking suggestive and leading questions to incompetent children. See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 328–29 (Md. 2005) (“To
allow the prosecution to utilize statements by a young child made in an environment
and under circumstances in which the investigators clearly contemplated use of the
statements at a later trial would create an exception that we are not prepared to recognize.”). But it is important to keep in mind that the prosecution must pass two obstacles before the admission of a hearsay statement—the evidentiary one and the
constitutional one. And as Crawford makes clear, the Confrontation Clause is not
meant to guarantee the substantive reliability of hearsay statements; that is the purpose of the rules of evidence. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)
(stating that the Confrontation Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner”). An unreliable statement or one
that was elicited by means of suggestive questioning should be considered inadmissible under the rules of evidence, not because its admission would contravene the
Confrontation Clause.
245
See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
242
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confrontation mentioned by the Supreme Court, such as Cobham’s
246
remarks about Sir Walter Raleigh’s apparent treason or Amy Hammon’s explanation to the police as to how her husband had beaten
247
her.
Present in those model situations is a person who knowingly
and voluntarily provided government officials with incriminating information about a party who was not currently present, and thus, the
248
declarant assumed the obligations of a witness.
Based on the
Court’s current jurisprudence, it seems that accusers are required to
stand by their previous assertions while confronted by the defendant
in a court of law so that any falsehoods are weaned out. Also, society
is likely to look down on individuals who make accusations and then
249
“hide behind the shadow.”
No analogous value would be served by requiring the three-yearold to face off with Buda and repeat the nonaccusatory statement,
250
“‘Dad says no one beat me. I fell when I was sleeping.’” N.M. did
not make a voluntary accusatory statement and then attempt to “hide
251
behind the shadow” but was cast into the role of an evidence giver
without any knowing and independent choice of his own. The value
of confrontation stressed by the Court seems to only make sense
when an individual voluntarily assumes the role of a witness by knowingly making statements that could be used in an adverse way
252
against an accused.
Furthermore, requiring a three-year-old child
to repeat a nonaccusatory statement in front of his alleged abuser
would not only be fruitless for confrontation purposes, but it also has
the potential to reduce the clause to a vehicle to intimidate some
child victims.
VI. A PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATION
Some courts have found children’s statements to be “nontestimonial” on grounds related to the notion of “testimonial” compe-

246

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 443.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2006).
248
See Clark, supra note 72, at 1267.
249
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
250
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 766 (N.J. 2008).
251
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
252
See Clark, supra note 72, at 1258 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment ought to be re-understood as primarily an accuser’s obligation rather
than primarily as a defendant’s right. We demand that those who would perform
this potentially dangerous, morally weighty, and symbolically loaded act—the act of
accusation—be willing to do so face to face.”).
247
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tence explored in this Comment. Without using the phrase “‘testimonial’ competence,” these courts have argued that a child’s statement is not “testimonial” because an objective child of the same age
and understanding would not have anticipated the prosecutorial use
253
of the statements. While that approach is a step in the right direction, courts preferably should follow the Federal Rules of Evidence
model so that no age of presumptive “testimonial” incompetence applies. While it is extremely unlikely for a very young child to be “testimonially” competent, it is essential to the defendant’s rights that the
court examine the child so that the court can make a determination
about whether that particular child reasonably could have anticipated
254
how his statements could be used under the circumstances. Even if
the child were young, if he appears to have recognized that his statements could be used to get someone in trouble with the law, then he
should be required to confront the defendant in court.
The state’s interest in protecting children from physical and
mental harm and the rights of the criminally accused are of equal
importance, and it is essential that the judicial system ensure that
both are given proper protection. To do so, states should require
child social-service workers, such as DYFS investigators, to videotape
255
their interviews with child-abuse victims.
If a criminal prosecution
253

See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 926 (Colo. 2006) (“[A]n objective sevenyear-old child would reasonably be interested in feeling better and would intend his
statements [to a doctor] to describe the source of pain and his symptoms. . . . He
would not foresee the statement being used in a later trial.”); State v. Bobadilla, 709
N.W.2d 243, 255–56 (Minn. 2006) (noting that because the child was only three, “it is
doubtful that he was even capable of understanding that his statements would be
used at trial”). But it should be noted that the Supreme Court mentioned in Crawford that the one case decided under Roberts that might be in conflict with new rule
set down in Crawford was White v. Illinois, where the Court held that a four-year-old’s
statements to a police officer were properly received into evidence under an excitedutterance hearsay exception and did not violate the Confrontation Clause, without
any showing that the child was unavailable. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58
n.8 (2004) (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349–45 (1992)). While this dictum
may seem to imply that the four-year-old’s statements were “testimonial,” which
would cast doubt upon using an objective-child perspective, the Court made it clear
that the issue in White dealt only with witness unavailability and its relation to the
Confrontation Clause. Id.
254
For example, a court could possibly conclude that even a young child could
have anticipated the prosecutorial use of his statements. See, e.g., State v. Justus, 205
S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo. 2006) (“Even at four years old, [the child]—who told [the social worker] that she would tell a judge what her father had done—was aware that
her statements could be used to prosecute [her father].”).
255
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that videotaping preliminary
interviews with child sex-abuse victims is beneficial because it enables judges to de-
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ensues, the court and the prosecutor should make efforts to have the
256
child testify at trial.
If the child is deemed incompetent to testify,
then the pretrial statement should also be deemed “nontestimonial”
because a child who is unable to undertake the duty and obligations
of a trial witness could not logically have recognized and assumed
257
those duties prior to trial.
In this situation, the videotape should
then be admitted in lieu of the DYFS worker’s testimony because it
258
Admission of the videotape
would be the best evidence available.
would pose no threat to the defendant’s confrontation right because
the statement is not “testimonial” and also would serve the twin goals
of the rules of evidence—allowing the fact finder to determine the
259
truth and to have the proceeding conducted in a just manner.
In
addition, this process reduces any threat of psychological harm that
may result as a consequence of a child giving testimony in front of his
260
alleged abuser.
If, however, the child is competent to testify but is ruled emotionally unavailable or does not testify for some other reason, it is intermine the reliability of any elicited statements. See State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372,
1379 n.1 (N.J. 1994).
256
Some commentators have noted that prosecutors have some influence over
whether a child is physically available to testify, and therefore, they must make goodfaith efforts to ensure children’s availability. See Mosteller, supra note 23, at 985–86.
Steps can also be taken to ensure that a potential child-witness is emotionally available. For example, it is constitutional to allow child-victims to testify via a closed circuit video system. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990). In addition, there
are ways to lessen the emotional strain of testifying in court, including (1) having the
judge appear less intimidating by removing his robe and reassuring the child that he
is not going to be sent to jail, (2) bringing the child to the courtroom before the trial, (3) explaining the trial and the roles of the various parties, and (4) allowing the
child to testify by using testimonial aids. See SHERRIE BOURG CARTER, CHILDREN IN THE
COURTROOM: CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 93–98 (2005).
257
See supra note 199 and accompanying text. Curiously, under Roberts, establishing that a child was incompetent to testify at trial would militate toward finding that
the Confrontation Clause would prohibit the pretrial statement from being admitted
into evidence because it would appear to lack the requisite indicia of reliability. See,
e.g., People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“If a child sexual
abuse victim is deemed ‘incompetent’ as a witness, a seeming paradox results from
the attempt to introduce into evidence that child’s out-of-court statements. It may
appear incongruous to allow into evidence the statements of someone declared incompetent to testify to the same events at trial just a few months later.”).
258
To justify the admission of this videotape, legislatures and courts would have to
create an additional hearsay exception on the grounds that the videotape is the best
and most reliable evidence available.
259
FED. R. EVID. 103. Significantly, this process parallels the historical treatment
of incompetent child witnesses. See supra note 191–194 and accompanying text.
260
See supra note 52.
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cumbent upon the court to determine whether the child was “testimonially” competent at the time the statement was made. In this regard, judges might use tort law as a guide for making their rulings. In
the law of torts, children are generally held to different standards
than adults and will be held liable for their negligent or reckless actions only when they have the capacity to appreciate the inherent risk
261
and danger associated with those actions. Capacity is a factual question that can be determined by the age, intelligence, and experience
262
of the particular child.
Those same factors should be used by
judges to determine the likelihood that the child-witness had the capacity to appreciate that his statement could or might be used in a
prosecutorial manner.
There is no denying that this will be a difficult task that will not
work perfectly, but the use of psychologists and common sense could
lead to reliable results. In addition, the videotaped interview could
prove very useful in aiding the judge’s determination of the child’s
“testimonial” competence because it allows the judge to factor in the
setting of the interview, the manner of questioning, and the child’s
responses to make a determination of whether the child could rea263
sonably anticipate the prosecutorial use of the statements.
If the
judge concludes based on the foregoing factors that the child was not
“testimonially” competent at the time the statement was made and
that the questioning was conducted in a nonleading or suggestive
264
manner, then the videotape should be admitted into evidence. If,
however, the judge determines that the child was “testimonially”
competent when he made the statement, then admitting the tape
without the child’s testimony in court would clearly violate the Confrontation Clause and should not be permitted.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Buda opinion demonstrates many of the problems that lower courts face when attempting to apply the vague and confusing directives of Crawford and Davis—problems that become much more
261

42 AM. JUR. 2d Infants § 133 (2000).
Id. § 134.
263
In addition, a preliminary review of the videotape would allow the judge to determine if the interviewer’s questions were leading, coercive, or suggestive.
264
The videotape would be admitted under the newly formed hearsay exception.
See supra note 258. Of course, if the questioning is leading or suggestive, it should be
declared too unreliable to meet the hearsay exception and should not be allowed into evidence.
262
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complicated and sensitive when dealing with very young child-abuse
victims. Instead of attempting to address the theoretical and practical
difficulties of the situation, the Buda majority relied on questionable
reasoning to achieve the result that it desired—avoiding confrontation between a three-year-old and his alleged abuser. To justify its
conclusion, the Buda court distorted Nurudeen’s role with law enforcement and also stretched the meaning of an “ongoing emergency” well beyond its common meaning and the definition provided by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Buda majority could have made its decision by focusing on
265
N.M.’s competence to make a “testimonial” statement.
Just as potential trial witnesses must possess a certain level of competency before testifying, extrajudicial declarants must also possess a minimum
level of competency before they can be assigned the role of “witness.”
While Crawford and Davis provide opaque instructions on how to
identify a “testimonial” statement, one essential criterion seems to be
that the declarant should realize that his statements could be used in
a subsequent criminal prosecution against a third party. This requirement presupposes that the declarant has the mental competence to make such a recognition. The declarant who is unable to
recognize the potential prosecutorial use is not making a “testimonial” statement; his statement is much more akin to a casual remark to
266
an acquaintance.
N.M., who was three years old and in a hospital
when he made the statements at issue, was unable to recognize that
Nurudeen had a prosecutorial purpose when she asked if anyone had
beaten him, notwithstanding the fact that the circumstances surrounding the dialogue made it clear that she did. Because his statements were not “testimonial,” the Confrontation Clause posed no bar
to their admission into evidence.
While addressing the “testimonial” competence of children is an
admittedly thorny issue, it is essential that courts make every effort to
find the delicate balance between the protection of child-victims and
the rights of the criminally accused. In this case, however, it seems
odd and absurd to force N.M. to come face-to-face with the defendant
to repeat his nonaccusatorial statement. As the Supreme Court
stated years ago, “no one would think of calling as a witness an infant

265

While few, if any, courts have used this terminology in the past, such a holding
would have drawn much-needed attention to the difficulties in this area of the law.
266
See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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only two or three years old.”
Perhaps, more than anything, Buda
demonstrates the necessity for more specific guidance on how to apply the “testimonial” framework to child-abuse victims. A criminal defendant’s constitutional rights and the state’s interest in protecting
children from abuse and trauma are far too important to be left up to
a vague legal doctrine that can be interpreted and applied in a subjective and unpredictable manner.

267

Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895).

